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WAR AND PEACE: OF LAW,
LAWLESSNESS, AND SOVEREIGNTY
Antje Mays
Winthrop University

Abstract
Laws of war have been carefully defined by individual nations’
own codes of law as well as by supranational bodies. Yet the
international scene has seen an increasing movement away from
traditionally declared war toward multinational peacekeeping missions
geared at containing local conflicts when perceived as potential threats
to their respective regions’ political stability. While individual nations’
laws governing warfare presuppose national sovereignty, the
multinational nature of peacekeeping scenarios can blur the lines of
command structures, soldiers’ national loyalties, occupational
jurisdiction, and raise profound questions as to which countries’ moral
sense/governmental system is to be the one upheld. Historically
increasingly complex international relations have driven increasingly
detailed internationally drafted guidelines for countries’ interactions
while at war, yet there are operational, legislative, and moral issues
arising in multinational peacekeeping situations which these laws do
not address at all. The author analyzes three unique peacekeeping
operations in light of these legislative voids and suggests systematic
points to consider to the end of protecting the peacekeepers, the
national interests of the countries involved, operational matters, and
clearly delineating both the objective and logical boundaries of a given
multinational peacekeeping mission.

Introduction
War and peace -- at opposite ends of the relational continuum
and yet inextricably linked: Historically, military presence has been
utilised for the express purpose of keeping the peace (or at least the
status quo of cease-fire) since the Versailles armistice of 1918. Do the
laws of war apply to multinational peacekeeping operations? Can they?
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Should they? What special points of legislation are needed to
accommodate the unique factors of peacekeeping operations? The
purpose of this paper is to show the completeness of the codified laws of
war in addressing many possible situations as well as to reveal areas
which are still today completely unaddressed. It traces the development
of thought on international law and rules of warfare from Classical and
mediaeval times. It follows these thoughts' ultimate incorporation in
modern-day laws and shows how their basic tenets still set the tone of
today's international relations. Then it summarises Korea, Liberia, and
the breakup of Yugoslavia – with analysis of the facets of international
law, rules of warfare, and legal quirks encountered in each scenario. It
concludes that we very much need legislation especially tailored to
peacekeeping, and it explores the operational/technical and legal
differences between war and peacekeeping and recommends specific
points which such legislation should accommodate. To work, any laws
governing war and peacekeeping must absolutely ensure a universal
standard of conduct (among the peacekeepers; toward civilians, neutral
realms, prisoners and wounded from either side of the conflict, toward
bordering nations' rights, toward violators of any of the established
international rules of civility), establish predictable lines of command,
allow for operational flexibility as demanded by developments, enforce
the peacekeepers' neutrality, ensure the recognition of the contingentcontributing nations' sovereignty, and protect the human rights of the
peacekeepers themselves.

Historic Overview
Since recorded history, warfare has permeated the development
of civilisations. While war was viewed as an instrument for selfprotection and/or advancement of one's culture and boundaries, schools
of thought actually devoted to war in any formal sense grew gradually.
Although the Romans were known for their cruelty in enslaving
captured soldiers (or enemy princes) for labor (if they did not execute
them), they generally practiced civility toward the vanquished civilian
populations and facilitated mechanisms of bringing these new areas
into the citizenry of Rome. And indeed it is the Western tradition of
thought which has been carried forward to this day, and lines of
thought on international law can be traced back to Classical times.
During the Migrations of the Peoples, military advances were typically
accompanied by pillaging the civilian populations, properties, and
countryside. Particularly Ghengis Khan was notorious for his ravages;

War and Peace

203

in the more westerly parts of un-Romanised Northern Europe, the
Vikings practiced the same indiscriminate killings and pillaging toward
the civilian populations of their vanquished. Philosophically one can
argue that the concepts of international law can be traced back to the
Classical cradle of Western civilisation.
Since the days of Greece and Rome, warfare has been (aside
from conquest tool) considered a subset of the state's right to selfpreservation. Then the timeframe between the fall of Rome and Italy's
Renaissance was bridged by the Roman Catholic Church fathers who
wrote on the human condition and on the chivalric duties of the
Christian soldier. This period also gave birth to the concept of “just
war”. Subsequently, with the Renaissance’s gradual secularisation of
the concepts of statehood and crossnational relations along with views
on human rights and statehood, three fundamental schools of thought
arose -- today they still form the philosophical basis of international
law. Machiavelli believed that the state had an inherent right and need
to protect itself from the surrounding chaos of other, disorderly,
civilizations. He saw war as a function of self-preservation. According
to Hugo Grotius, on the other hand, war is a function of international
law -- to regulate international behavior and the standards by which
the international society exists. A universal honor code unspokenly
defines crossnational codes of conduct. In the thinking of Hobbes,
Rousseau, and Kant, man is naturally self-seeking and subjects himself
to government to avoid the cycle of mutual destruction. These three
schools of thought disagree on the level to which an international
society exists or whether its existence should be acknowledged as a
conduct-defining code. However, they do share the natural law concept
of certain human rights such as individual liberty and safety, the
concern for the greater good, and a desire for the injection and
maintenance of civility in relations among states and in instances of
war – a trait still seen in all recent multinational peacekeeping
missions and international diplomacy in general.
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Today’s Laws of War – Their Meaning and Realm
of Jurisdiction
National Level: Laws of war, in the purest sense, address national
defense and govern the nations' conduct while at war. Our Title 50
(War and national defense) endeavors to accommodate every possible
nuance of encounter in which our armed forces might find themselves.
Yet the law confines itself to justice within the military (at war as well
as peace), proper conduct toward nations with which the US are at war,
and to emergency legislation -- it is clearly tailored to the United States
at war.
International level: The Hague and Geneva Conventions take great
care to emphasise human rights and civility in the event of conflict.
They aim to balance each nation's right to self-defense with the need to
regulate behavior among nations. These Conventions, enforceable
under UN auspices, mandate:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Protection of immunity from attack for neutral territories
Full protection of neutrality for war hospitals,
humanitarian aid stations, and their personnel
Protection of civilians, cultural and private property, and
merchant vessels
Humane treatment of war prisoners
Respect for fundamental human rights
Fair trials for war crimes
Distinctions between belligerents and spies

Origins Of International Law And Laws Of War
Greece and Rome (900 BC - 476 AD): Empires were built on and
maintained through use of military force. Both Classical Athens and
Rome originated as city states with the romantic ideal of purity on the
part their respective citizens. Within a century however, each had
progressed to a sense that virtue had to be exported to surrounding
"barbarians" and that its own population needed to be protected from
the uncivilised influences of the neighboring peoples of lesser intellect,
refinement, and social/cultural development.
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Middle Ages (476 - 1400 AD): In the chaos which ensued all over
Europe following the official fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD, the
virtues of literacy, scholarship, and higher thought were upheld by the
Church fathers who wrote extensively on the condition of man. St.
Augustine wrote on the duties of the Christian soldier -- rules which
spelt out moral conduct and humane treatment of prisoners and
vanquished. The character of the Holy Roman Empire was marked by
the notion that war was a necessary means of protecting the Christian
lands from he surrounding heathen nations and their corrupting
influences. War was also viewed as the papal instrument of spreading
the Gospel -- the distortion of moral and spiritual conviction and
crossing into senseless cruelty and plundering found ample
manifestation during the Crusades. A double standard governed the
“rules of warfare” in that Christian nations at war endeavored to abide
by basic chivalric codes while no concern for any human rights was
shown toward populations of the non-Christian countries. In many
respects this was a period of many extremes, one in which profound
exploration of human nature, rights, and spirituality existed side by
side with unchecked cruelty of war that was unrestrained by any rules
of morality or regard for human rights. And yet this period also yielded
three important traditions still found today: The Pax ecclesiae (Peace
of God) of 990 outlawed attack on monastic buildings, civilian persons
and women. The Treva dei (Truce of God) of 1027 decreed the
suspension of fighting during holidays and Lent. And this period gave
rise to the concept of bello jus (just war): By definition of bello jus a
country had the moral right and obligation to enforce human rights and
punish crimes against such beyond its own territorial boundaries.
Grotius later referred to this idea as the duties of the international
society to defend rights and regulate crossnational conduct. And today
bello jus still forms the basic motivation for every peacekeeping
operation mounted in our present time.
Machiavelli (1469-1527): Niccolo Machiavelli was the product of the
corrupt fledgling secularisation of government and society during the
Italian Renaissance. Having suffered through political intrigues
between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, the brutal end of the
Florentine Republic, subsequent imprisonment and torture, he viewed
war as a means of upholding the rights of one's citizens and as the
protection of the republican ideal from the surrounding forces of
lawlessness, chaos, and corruption.
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Erasmus (1469-1536): Desiderius Erasmus, foremost scholar of
Classics and Church texts, observed the warfare of his day as an
hypocritical tool by which the papacy sought to expand its boundaries.
In Erasmus' day wars were waged largely under religious pretext -- he
thus saw war as contemptible, lawless, senseless, and devoid of all
civility. As Machiavelli's Dutch contemporary, Erasmus witnessed the
same papal corruption and thereto-connected fledgling secular regimes,
albeit from more of an observer’s stance. However, his observations of
contemporaneous politics and his loss of personal acquaintances to
battles prompted him to be against war at all cost, even if its avoidance
meant an unjust peace -- he could not bring himself to think of any war
as "just war", regardless of its cause.
Grotius (1583-1645): Although the idea of human rights of safety and
liberty were not new, Grotius was a key thinker in putting together the
notion of individual human rights and safety with the moral obligation
to uphold and defend them across national boundaries. According to
Grotius, an international society exists in which there is an overriding
moral obligation to regulate behavior. Grotius saw the normative,
communicative, and procedural roles of law in arranging and ordering
society. War was seen as an international outgrowth of moral
obligation to uphold certain natural rights -- it was viewed as a
procedural means to the end of preserving liberty. Today many
international lawyers and diplomats still subscribe to this Grotian view
of law and process -- which is seen in the general climate of the moral
obligation to uphold and protect human rights whenever a
peacekeeping operation is mandated or at least when sanctions are
imposed on a "bully" country.
Hobbes (1588-1679), Rousseau (1712-1778), Kant (1724-1804): The
Kantian philosophy is generally labelled as a mix of Freethinking,
liberal, paired with the Hobbesian survivalist/utilitarian element of
self-preservation through individual submission to government. Kant
was very aware of the need to balance the moral obligation of the
individual to contribute to the society with allowing a government to
order the society. Kant shared the Grotian mindset of individual
natural rights but was primarily a social philosopher rather than legal
scholar per se. He believed that rights could only be upheld within the
framework of necessary laws ("social contract") -- he favored Rousseau's
notion that the intrinsically self-seeking humans voluntarily
subordinate themselves to a government to avoid the mutual
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destruction so that a moral order could be upheld. Kant disapproved of
war personally but viewed it as an at times inevitable means of
upholding one's citizens' rights and maintaining social order across
borders. As the result of his subscription to Rousseau's "social contract"
notion, Kant had been labelled as an utopianist/revolutionist in whose
views are the roots of socialism and despotism as practiced by Hitler
and Stalin. Thus the name of Kant fell into disfavor after WWII and
during the onset of the Cold War.
Declaration of Paris (1856): This treaty established maritime law
among the major powers of Europe. It declared neutrality of neutral
countries' vessels and seaborne goods. The treaty also prescribed
sufficient force to enforce a maritime blockade.
Unspoken Progress…: Though largely unspoken, the concepts of
individual rights and responsibilities, as well as an undergirding (albeit
unspoken) code of civility were widely recognised as established rules of
warfare.
The War Between the States (1861-1865): The American Civil War
has largely been criticised for its large-scale atrocities and excessive
loss of life. This war yielded the first official war-crimes trial. In the
latter part of the war, the Confederate-administered war-prison camp
lacked basic life support systems such as sanitation, medicine, and food
as the result of the financial state of the impoverished Confederate
government. The Swiss-German physician in charge of the camp, Major
Henry Wirz, was entrusted with upholding the unspoken rules of
civility toward prisoners. However, in his care, thousands of Union
prisoners died of malnutrition, diseases, and exposure to the elements.
He was tried before a military tribunal; his argument of having carried
out the orders of the prison camp commander was dismissed, as Dr.
Wirz did have at his disposal the operational autonomy and basic
supplies to act within the moral boundaries of humane treatment of
war prisoners. In the end, he was sentenced to death by hanging -- this
marked the first official outrage with war atrocities and the first official
recognition of war crimes as a legal concept of breach with the codes of
civility and humane treatment of war prisoners. In many respects this
was the first trial for “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against
the laws of war”.
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Lieber Code (1863): Francis Lieber, a German-born legal scholar,
drew up sets of rules of military conduct and they were formally
integrated as General Order 100 for the United States Army. The
Prussian Army code of 1870 was based on Lieber's ideas and proved
thorough and comprehensive in the Franco-Prussian War. The code
endeavored to anticipate all possible scenarios of the battlefield,
marshal law, espionage, desertion, encounters with civilians,
merchants, prisoners of war, wounded, armistice, capitulation, and
humanitarian issues. It condemned use of poison, enslavement as
retaliation, and violation of personal dignity. In many respects it was
the catalyst of European interest in internationally binding agreements
governing war and wartime conduct.
Geneva Convention of 1864: As the result of the Crimean War and
the Franco-Austrian War in which wounded were not properly cared
for, the international community agreed to convene in Geneva to
establish protection for Red Cross personnel and neutrality for war
hospitals.
St. Petersburg Agreement (1868): As the result of having observed
often haphazard shooting of strategic insignificance, military leaders
agreed to ban bullet use -- this marked the first international treaty
geared to banning weapons use.
Hague Conventions (1899, 1907, 1954):
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I,
1899 –
updated 1907)
Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war
on land
(Hague II, 1899)
Convention relative to the opening of hostilities (Hague
III,
1907)
Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on
land (Hague IV, 1907) Convention respecting the rights
and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of
war on land (Hague V, 1907)
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Convention respecting the protection of cultural property
(Hague, 1954)
The rights of belligerents were declared not to be unlimited.
Inhumane treatments such as arbitrary arrests and detention,
harassment of civilians, seizing or destruction of private property,
maltreatment of war prisoners, encroachments on personal dignity,
genocide were outlawed, and the Convention for Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes was drawn up along with the creation of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration which still fulfills its function at The
Hague. Neutral territories cannot aid or hinder either side of the
conflict and must keep the conflict from entering their neutral territory.
On the other side, neutral territories have the right to be left out of the
conflict and their territory to be respected by surrounding belligerents.
These conventions also provided for the protection of cultural property
(1954) by codifying their safety from attack whenever these culturally
significant buildings are not used for military purposes.
The Hague Conventions drew many of its undergirding
principles from the Lieber Code and, in turn, influenced the
philosophical framework and organisation of the League of Nations
which followed the end of the First World War.
Geneva Conventions (1864, 1949, 1977 Protocols): The 1864
Convention for the Amelioration if the Wounded in Time of War
established clear guidelines governing the safety of hospital and
humanitarian facilities:
• Immunity of war hospitals and personnel (thus
protecting them from capture or attack while treating
sick soldiers);
• Impartial acceptance and treatment of soldiers from
either side of the conflict;
• Protection of civilians aiding the war wounded;
• International recognition of the Red Cross as a symbol
bindingly identifying war hospitals and aid stations
covered by this agreement.
This was the first convention spelling out the duties of neutrality
in war. 1928: Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods
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of warfare. 1949: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field.
(Geneva I)
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea
(Geneva II)
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war
(Geneva III)
Convention relative to Crimes Against Humanity
Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in
time of war
(Geneva IV)
This convention reiterated principles previously codified
by Lieber and in the Hague Conventions. These actions were
outlawed :
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deportation of groups or persons
Genocide (specially adopted by UN General
Assembly 1948: Convention on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide)
Taking hostages
Encroachments on personal dignity
Torture
Collective punishments when only one specific
person should be punished for a given crime
Unwarranted destruction of property, especially
civilian property
Discrimination on account of race, political
persuasion, nationality, religion.

The 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts
(Protocol II), extended the Conventions' protection to the parties of an
internal conflict such as in civil war and guerrilla soldiers. This
measure was the response to insurrections and colonial independence
wars -- atrocities particularly in Vietnam had caused worldwide concern
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over the question of jurisdiction or applicability of any laws in dealing
with such atrocities. This aspect of applicability to guerrilla warfare
raises internationally examined issues at every occurrence of any
(especially internal) conflict: Do these protocols apply to conflict-ridden
nations who are not signatories to them? At which point should the
international community step in?
Treaty of Versailles (1919): Following the 1918 armistice, this treaty
was designed to hold the vanquished Germans to reparations to the
Allies. More importantly, the treaty stipulated German disarmament
and the Allied Occupation forces’ initial presence was designed to quell
the potential revival of German military aggression. Both of these
elements of disarmament and military presence to keep an aggressor in
check were later adopted by the UN Charter.
League of Nations (1920 -1939): Following the atrocities of World
War I, US President Woodrow Wilson spearheaded the League of
Nations -- a supranational organisation formed by the Allied nations
and headquartered in Geneva. Its purpose was the maintenance of
peace and prevention of war by means of collective condemnation of
would-be-belligerents. The League's Covenant stipulated the immunity
of its officials and buildings, called for arms reduction, and peaceful
means of resolving conflicts among the League's member nations. The
basic tenets followed the principles of the Hague Conventions and were
incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations which followed in
1945. The League was however discredited after failing to prevent
Germany's (and the rising Hitler's) disregard of the Versailles Treaty
and forcible reclamation of the Rhineland, Japanese invasion of China's
Manchuria, and Italy's overrunning of Ethiopia. In addition, the US
had, during the interwar years, reverted to its tradition of choosing
isolation from world affairs, leaving no one to effectively enforce the
League's cause. In the end it was disbanded in 1939.
United Nations (1945- ): The United Nations, headquartered in New
York City, was founded 1945 in response to the atrocities and war
crimes of World War II, and as an endeavor to carry forward the initial
mission of its predecessor. After two wars, the United States decided
that their involvement was necessary to maintain an impartial
involvement in world affairs and did not again withdraw from such
supranational endeavors of preserving peace.
The Charter of the
United Nations declares the UN's primary mission as the preservation
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of peace and the deterrence against use or threat of use of force upon
any other territory. Its approach to conflict contains three stages:
1. Pacific settlement of disputes (thus eliminating any
perceived need for hostilities and legitimate reasons
for conflict)
2. Collective security (thereby deterring conflict-ridden
regions from escalating: the "collective show of
strength" is designed to tell the belligerents that the
international military strength is too much for them
to withstand)
3. Disarmament (banning weapons shipments, depriving
the belligerent of military supplies, thereby "starving"
the arsenals and ultimately the conflict).
Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
1. Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their
destruction (1972)
2. Convention on the prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques
(1977)
Nuremberg War Crime Trials: The Allied tribunal established in
Nuremberg was chartered to try key individuals for crimes against
these three major areas of international law:
1. Crimes against peace (by waging a war of aggression)
2. War crimes (i.e. violations of laws and customs of war
as set forth in the Hague Conventions)
3. Crimes against humanity (such as genocide, murder,
humiliation, encroachment on the dignity of civilians).
The precedent set by the Nuremberg War Crime Trials is that the
practice emphasised the punishment and sentencing of individual
perpetrators, the treatment of specific persons as criminals rather than
transferring this "criminal" status to the entire nation.
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NATO: The North American Treaty Organisation was founded 1949 as
a safety measure to balance power with the Soviet Union and its
satellite East European countries which it absorbed in all senses but
formal government. Its members included the Western Allies and later
West Germany. NATO’s basic premise of deterrence against Soviet
expansion further west into devastated Europe was that any attack
against one constituted attack against all. The end result was the
threat of US retaliation against any Soviet attacks on a NATO member
country – this strategy served effectively against further expansion.
With the end of the Cold War ushered in by the 1989 fall of the Berlin
Wall and the subsequent collapse of communism across Eastern
Europe, the role NATO has been changing from Cold War watchdog to a
European alliance styled more after supranational political (rather than
military) organisations. It was NATO which decided to stage the
peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia after its beginning civil war in
1991, as the unrest was viewed as a security threat for the greater part
of Central Europe.
Vienna Conventions and Subsequent Protocols:
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations
(1961)
Vienna Convention on consular relations (1963)
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties(1969)
Currently Existing Laws of War – Their Scope: At the national
level laws of war address national defense and govern the nation's
conduct while at war. Their scope also includes civilian rights and
duties under martial law and define the soldier’s duty of service and
loyalty to his country. At the international level war-related legislation
follows the Grotian spirit of international law: Regulation of behavior
across lines of state, respect for the natural human rights of the
individual, insistence upon humanity in instances of armed conflict,
enforceable mandates prescribing the treatment of various groups who
are caught up in the effects of war.
Legal Issues Motivating Peacekeeping Missions
1. Crimes against peace
2. Crimes against humanity
3. Crimes against laws of war as set forth in the
Conventions.
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Peacekeeping Examples – In The Name Of
Conflict Containment
Korea
Synopsis/chronology:
Although this was technically not a
peacekeeping operation, its use of collective strength did prove an
example of deterring crimes against peace and against a nation’s right
to self-determination: Following World War II, the United States and
Soviet Union convened in Moscow in 1945 to settle the matter of
establishing a unified postwar Korean government. The North had
come under Soviet military jurisdiction, was not permitted to
participate in the negotiations with the UN and US-spearheaded
initiative, and established a Soviet-style government. Meanwhile the
South held elections and established a Western-style government under
the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. In 1950
the Russians staged an invasion south of the 38th parallel dividing
these two states, and China soon joined the Russian cause. The UN
Security Council quickly resolved that UN members should resist the
communist invasion. Heavy casualties, especially for US troops, did not
result in wresting a unified Korean republic from communist control.
Instead, the dividing line settled in its original place at the 38th
parallel, and US troops are stationed in South Korea (with “UN
blessing”) to this day – to discourage the Soviet Union or Communist
China from repeated invasion.
Legal Issues and Technicalities:
1. A nation’s right to self-determination and selfdefense. Invasion was a direct violation of this right.
2. Crimes against peace. Invasion also violated peaceful
coexistence.
3. Collective security: Show of collective strength on the
part of the UN members (as a token of the
international community’s commitment to the rights
of nations to self-determination) led to negotiations
ending the Korean War and formal recognition of each
Korean area’s autonomy.
4. Deterrence: In conjunction with collective security,
the continued presence of US troops under UN
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auspices keeps potential aggressors at bay and has so
far successfully prevented a repeated invasion from
the North.
5. Quirks in jurisdiction: China protested against the
UN resolution, arguing on the premise that it had no
representation on the United Nations; the Soviets’
boycott of the meetings rendered them unable to veto
the resolution. The question of whether a nation can
be held to standards to which it chose not subordinate
itself later resurfaced in form of countries seeking
exemption on the premise that they were not
signatories to a given set of Conventions.
Although this operation was not officially labelled as a peacekeeping
operation per se (and even though the UN members did enter in
decidedly on the side of South Korea), its beginnings did have all the
trappings of a call to bello jus, supranational commitment to upholding
nations’ and people’s rights to safety and liberty, desire to effect and
maintain peace, and the question of the international laws’ jurisdiction
over the nations involved in a given conflict.

Liberia
Synopsis/chronology: Liberia enjoyed a tradition of relative
prosperity, republican ideals and affinity to the United States since
World War II, UN participation and active involvement in international
affairs and African regional issues. However, economic declines and
financial hardships brought on by declining export prices of its rubber
and iron ore bred the conditions for a coup d’etat in 1980. General
Samuel Doe took control of Liberia under marshal law following the
president’s murder. A new constitution was instituted in 1986; promise
of return to civilian government was followed by elections after which
the coup leader Samuel Doe was elected as president. He was put
down by the rebellious Krahn, Gio, and Mano tribes whose fighting
ushered in a brutal civil war which raged from 1989 until an official
cease-fire of August 1996. Present-day endeavors to quell sprouts
pocket fighting is finding unique expression in ECOWAS’ confiscation of
weapons from the various factions.
Rivals’ contention for power prolonged the struggle – over the
course of six years, Liberia’s society, economy, and infrastructure
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disintegrated completely. West Africa’s ECOWAS Monitoring Group
was augmented by UN observers. The governmental and societal
structures, however, were dissolving so rapidly that all order completely
collapsed and along with it any regard for human rights.
Peacekeepers’ and observers’ lives were gravely endangered, and
Tanzania withdrew its contingent – both for frustration with the
stalemate and out of concern for the safety of its troops. Rebuilding is
slowed by the massive population displacement. Many children were
abused, traumatised, abandoned, have become orphaned, and have
become addicted to drugs. Medical facilities are substandard and
inaccessible, slowing the process of proper care for the vast needy
population.

Legal and Technical Complications
Chaos:
The civil war was so bloody and the hostilities so
uncontrollable that:
1. peacekeepers' lives were endangered and their
neutrality was not respected
2. the entire social structure and civilised infrastructure
collapsed
3. ultimately, peacekeepers were withdrawn due to the
excessive dangers and the lack of progress toward
peace achievement
Crimes against humanity: Aside from the indigenous traditional
practice of female mutilation, the civil war has catalysed numerous
instances of mutilation of babies, massacres, taking hostages, beating,
rape, torture, killing, maiming, dismemberment, beheading,
cannibalising of civilians by faction leaders.
4. Crimes against individual liberty in form of arbitrary
arrest and detention.
5. Crimes against protection of private property not
involved in the conflict: Arbitrary intrusions into
homes, capricious arrests, pillaging, looting, theft,
confiscation and destruction of property.
6. Denial of fair public trial: The civil war has also
resulted in the collapse of the judicial system.
Capricious justice is carried out by faction leaders –
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“confessions” to guilt and/or innocence are solicited by
means of torturing the defendants.
7. Crimes against the established rules of warfare:
Prison conditions are unsanitary and life-threatening.
People are captured and held prisoner without actual
charges. Prisoners are mistreated – mentally abused
in form of threatened executions, physically abused in
form of rape, beatings, torture, and starvation.
8. Violation of neutral rights paired with crimes
against humanity:
UN convoys for medical and
humanitarian relief are repeatedly attacked by
fighters from all sides of the conflict. This hinders aid
to the wounded soldiers and displaced civilians, and
this situation violates the neutral rights of the
humanitarian and medical relief workers.
9. Violation of established rules of warfare and crimes
against humanity on peacekeepers’ part! ECOMOG
soldiers detained groups of people, including civilians,
in arbitrary capriciousness.

The Break-Up Of Yugoslavia
Synopsis: In many respects, this conflict has its roots in the region’s
mediaeval conquest and oppression by the Ottoman Turks.
Historically, at times of autonomy, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had
been separate kingdoms respectively – until their administrative
combination under Yugoslavia following the end of World War I.
Following World War II and the Soviet expansion of its political
influence of communist/military rule, Yugoslavia became a Soviet
satellite. Under Communism’s Tito and subsequent strong centralised
government, the various ethnic groups had lived together as neighbors
peacefully. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently of the
Iron Curtain in 1990, so hailed by romanticists around the world as the
beginning of a new era of peace, also led to the demise of the
Communist regime in Yugoslavia. With that, a power vacuum ensued
and the power struggle began.
Ethnic propaganda fueled Bosnian resentment over the Serbian
"cultural code" which defined the leadership of Yugoslavia at large.
Isolated animosities gradually escalated into a full-blown civil war from
1991. This conflict, mainly between Bosnians and Serbs, raged on until
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1996. With it, the world saw indiscriminate imprisonment, torture,
rape, and mass murder of civilians, the destruction of beautiful
architectural jewels and cultural and historical treasures. And the
international community wondered with concern whether the ethnic
conflict would spread into neighboring Hungary, Albania, and/or
Macedonia – especially after Macedonia’s 1991 secession from
Yugoslavia.
Legal Complications and Issues: Tragedy, crimes against peace,
war atrocities, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, crimes
against the protection of cultural and historic properties, the potential
to draw neighboring nations into the conflict -- they all formed a grisly
backdrop for the legal scenario against which the international
community must sift through the events. As in the Nuremberg
tradition, individuals are being tried for their alleged crimes; however,
blurred evidence is making actual convictions less likely than originally
hoped and anticipated.
1. UN sanctions were declared as well as arms blockades
-- this posed the question as to whether the
international community's UN-Charter-mandated
right to "disarm via cutting off weapons supply"
outweighed the Hague-mandated individual nations'
right to self-defense under international law.
2. Collective security: NATO planes enforced the no-fly
zone and bombed Serbian forces who were attacking a
Bosnian enclave. Dayton Agreements -- based on the
UN-suggested "collective force". The US fighter
arsenal in Dayton, OH was shown to the chief leaders
of the Yugoslav conflict as an unspoken warning of
force to be unleashed on the conflict if no agreement
were reached. Soon after, the Dayton Accords were
signed in March 1996. Whether the cease-fire lasts
remains to be seen.
Aside from murky legal
complications of international jurisdiction or the
applicability of laws of war by custom, the former
Yugoslavia has tragically lost many of its historic
treasures, social structure, and civil infrastructure.
Moreover, massive antigovernment demonstrations in
Bosnia and Croatia (in reaction to both new countries’
leaders’ autocratic measures) show the fragility of the
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fledgling rebuilding efforts in their newness – while a
concerned international community looks on uneasily.
3. The absolute neutrality of the peacekeepers was
questioned when the Western world emphasised
Serbian atrocities against Bosnian Muslims -- The
Serbs felt that the peacekeepers were ignoring
Bosnian Muslim atrocities against the Serbs. It did
seem that the peacekeepers’ sympathies (and those of
world opinion) tilted toward the Bosnian Muslims,
even if that was unintentional. If this is true, this
would be an incident of taking sides, which cannot be
allowed if peacekeeping is to remain a neutral conflict
containment tool as we know it.
4. The entire definition of neutrality of the
peacekeepers. By definition, their neutrality extends
to their duty to keep the conflict from spreading
beyond its existing boundaries. By definition, they
are compelled to an absolute, obligatory impartiality.
Is this the Geneva-mandated definition of neutrality?
Is it implicitly transferred to the peacekeepers
without being expressly stated verbatim? Is this an
as-of-yet unspoken code? If yes, then neutrality for
peacekeepers must be defined and codified.
5. Confusing command jurisdiction – individual nations
under UN command? Respect for peacekeepers’
sovereignty? A UN-mandated peacekeeping mission
was deployed in Macedonia – partially in response to
an assassination attempt on its president (and
maintain internal stability), partially also to keep the
Yugoslavian civil war and its ethnic passions from
spreading into Macedonia.. In its course, US Army
medic Michael New, in his patriotism of serving in the
US forces, refused in 1993 to cast off the US insignia
to wear the UN emblem and blue helmet. In January
1994 he was court-martialed in Germany, discharged
dishonorably on bad-conduct charges, and disqualified
from receiving veterans’ benefits. This incident over
command loyalties sent shockwaves of scandal around
the world. Previously, US Congress had introduced
a bill which would render US soldiers wearing of UN
insignia illegal, and Michael New gained support and
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sympathy among conservative legislators and
military/international law scholars. Loyalty disputes
between the US and UN were not new to Macedonia:
The placement of American troops under often
incompetent UN command had endangered US
soldiers’ lives, procedurally tied their hands, made
them appear incompetent themselves, and rendered
the US the laughingstock of the world. Images of US
soldiers being dragged through the streets of Somalia
and their fear of Haitian thugs (due to absence of any
UN-approved rights to self defense!!) set a
detrimental precedent for the safety of peacekeepers.
6. Sovereignty or World Government?
More
importantly, the legislative implications of this
measure are of historic proportions: Presidential
decision directive 13 (PDD-13) (drafted by the Council
on Foreign Relations in 1993) aims to place US troops
under UN command. This would turn the UN
Secretary General into the technical commander-inchief of worldwide armed forces (which would, of
course, be deployed under peacekeeping tenets) and
relinquish the United States’ control over its own
soldiers to a multinational administrative body.
Where would be the end of possibilities encouraged by
such a precedent? Would this set the stage for the
end of individual nations’ right to self-determination
and sovereignty as we know it?
7. Of morality, principle, and constitution… We must
never forget a nation's moral obligation to protect its
own citizens (civilian and military alike) from
betrayal to foreign governments and crimes against
their freedom and personal dignity. And a government
has the absolute constitutional responsibility to
uphold its nation's right to self-determination and
self-defense.
8. Lesson learnt from the Michael New incident?
Interestingly, the US troops now being sent to Zaire
for humanitarian assistance with the refugees' return
to Rwanda are being expressly placed specifically
under US command.
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War and Peacekeeping – Differences and
Similarities
Technically, the state of war, the state of militarily expressed
antagonism between two or more nations, forms the backdrop of war
laws' applicability. War begins and a nation enters in on a very clearly
decided "side" of the conflict. Peacekeeping, by contrast, is typically
initiated by entities neutral to an existing conflict -- forces are deployed
by NATO, UN, or other regional organizations such as OAU, ECOWAS,
or OAS -- for the purpose of intervening in a civil war and/or
safeguarding a delicately obtained cease-fire. None of the peacekeeper
countries are themselves at war (neither with each other nor with the
region to which they were deployed), a scenario beginning to hint at the
need for laws beyond the traditional laws of war. Moreover, the
contingents forming the peacekeeping group become an entity which
poses proven temptation to transcend national command lines and
raises the question of continued recognition for the sovereignty of the
individual nations whose troops serve on these multinational
peacekeeping missions.
Despite these major differences, peacekeeping scenarios also
share many of the physical elements of war:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

prisoners
casualties
movement of troops
aspects of objectives and strategies
equipment
humanitarian relief efforts.

Applicability Of War-Related Laws To
Peacekeeping Scenarios
Context: Typically, peacekeeping operations are called to action in
events of an internal conflict. Philosophically this step is a last-resort
attempt by a concerned international community to prevent a
simmering conflict from escalating into a full-blown war of
international proportions. This step is taken upon recognition of having
missed the opportunity to resolve the dispute peacefully: either in
hopes of keeping a conflict from flaming out of control or in a more
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pragmatic pursuit of desiring to impose an internationally mandated
calming-down. This was the case following the cease-fire ending the
Korean War, Rwanda, Liberia, and the civil war which ultimately
caused the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
Applicability: In light of the fact that peacekeepers are deployed to
zones of armed conflict, it is logical then that the rules of warfare under
customary international law still apply to all operational aspects the
conflict.
Jurisdiction: All persons on the scene must absolutely be held to the
moral precepts outlined in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. This
includes all combatants on each side of the conflict, and the
peacekeepers themselves must be held to the standards of peace,
humanity and rules of warfare.
Distinctions: While the combatants are also subject to the rules of
warfare in terms of war prisoners, treatment of civilians, and neutral
zones and persons, and cultural and historic properties, peacekeepers
have a multifaceted additional burden: Though endowed with the
privilege of immunity from attack by combatants from either side of the
conflict, they must reciprocate unconditionally this gesture of neutrality
by refraining from taking sides. They may defend themselves against
either side’s belligerents, within parameters which have yet to be
clearly defined.

Peacekeeping Scenarios – Typical Pitfalls
Quagmires of jurisdiction and legality for the conflicted regions:
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions state rather clearly the rights and
duties of nations at war, they are after all written for relations between
nations at war. Out of concern over internal anti-colonial movements
and insurrections (for which the 1949 Conventions offered no legally
binding jurisdiction), the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
extended these obligations and boundaries of civility as codified in the
war-pertinent laws and treaties to insurgents internal to a given
country. This was done in the hopes of affording some sort of protection
to those who are not part of the conflict: Civilians, nations of neutral
territories, merchants, humanitarian and hospital workers.
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Quirks and Ambiguities: Those wishing to be exempt from the rules
of civility, especially wagers of an warfare internal to territorially
defined country, might point to the Geneva Conventions describing at
length the obligations in the event of an international (rather than
internal) conflict. But no, they say, this is not an international dispute,
therefore the Geneva rules do not apply… Insurgent-types such as
German terrorists, Basques, IRA fighters are not governed by any
international laws of war, whereas territorial gains on the part of
insurgents in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the former Yugoslavia
brought about war-like scenarios of territorial advances, prisoners,
casualties, civilians caught up in the conflict, wounded, and the needs of
these wounded. Precedent seems to indicate that the decision on
whether any of the Hague and Geneva Conventions (and 1977
Protocols) can apply is governed by the question of whether any of the
internal combatants have seized and gained control of territory
formerly belonging to other parts of the country (as the territorial
advances in Bosnia and Serbia illustrated most vividly).
Jurisdiction over signatories only? For invaders: The question
remains whether the belligerents themselves are nationals of signatory
nation -- under which premise they could technically argue exemption
from the Geneva Conventions’ jurisdiction.
This problem was
encountered in Iraq when the torturous and inhumane treatment of
prisoners of war, in terms of ethics and technicality, violated the
Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of war prisoners. Iraq
argued on the premise of not being a signatory of the Geneva
Conventions. For guerrillas: This aspect of applicability to guerrilla
warfare and insurrection with resulting warlike scenarios and
territorial gains raises questions of legal applicability: If the conflictridden country is not a signatory to the 1977 Protocols, a region home to
an internal conflict may argue that these laws set forth in these
protocols do not apply at all – despite evidence of all the trappings of
insurrection against an existing central government, territorial
advances and conquest, and needs of wounded and civilian populations.
For the Peacekeepers Themselves:
1. What if any peacekeepers’ home nations are not
signatory to any of the Conventions? Can they be
permitted to enforce principles to which their own
home countries chose not to subordinate themselves?
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2. Fuzzy command structures, lack of clarity as to which
nation’s soldiers are under which nation’s command.
( Command loyalty issues ( attempted legislation to
subordinate US troops to UN command ( implications
for the future sovereignty of nations?
3. Temptation to enter the conflict on either side – this
could divide the peacekeepers.
4. Violation of the peacekeepers’ neutrality rights by
either side’s belligerents.
5. Safety concerns for peacekeepers and humanitarian
relief workers.
6. For the international community: Where does the
international community’s “just war” -mandated right
to interfere with a conflict-ridden region end and
become a one-world police state of capricious
arbitration?

How Well Do The Current Laws Of War Address
Peacekeeping Needs?
Regarding the utilitarian elements of warfare, the laws of war
provide excellent scope and umbrella legislation. They leave nothing to
the imagination in the context of propriety in declaration of war and
conduct of hostilities, respect for human rights, neutrality (of neutral
countries, of war hospitals, immunity of humanitarian relief stations),
special status for civilians, diplomats, citizens of countries /regions not
involved in the conflict, treatment of war prisoners. Above all, we
must remember that these laws “by the international community for
the international community” are conventions which govern the conduct
of the individual countries which are themselves at war.
The
peacekeepers are “guests” to the conflict, despite their role as “neutrally
appointed benevolent mediator-at-arms”.

Peacekeeping Laws – Points Which They Should
Address
Pitfalls unique to peacekeeping need special laws to allow the
peacekeepers to avoid having their hands tied by the very laws of war
on which basis they are deployed in the first place: Special laws for
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peacekeeping operations should accommodate the two components of
moral issues and legal technicalities and operations:
Moral Issues and Legal Technicalities: In the spirit of natural law
and international law, laws of war are not isolated from universal codes
of morality or humanity. Peacekeeping missions are fielded from the
heart of this very sense of moral obligation to humanity. Multinational
peacekeeping is beleaguered with the issues of participants'
sovereignty, jurisdiction, command structures, service on foreign soil,
international conduct. The laws of war have been expanded for setting
the tone of peacekeeping operations. At best these laws (codified in form
of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, specific statusof-forces agreements, case-specific resolutions) implicitly address the
wartime scenarios encountered by peacekeepers. Yet while the
“mechanics” of warfare have been afforded ample consideration, there
are several completely unaddressed major areas that are routinely
encountered by peacekeepers:
1. National loyalties: In the situation of joint forces
formed by several countries’ peacekeeping
contingents, the question of which countries’ soldiers
serve under which country’s command.
2. Respect for the sovereignty of the nations whose
troops are participating in a given peacekeeping
effort. From a moral and ethical perspective, there is
great need for delineating the distinction between
serving one's own country and serving a multinational
"ad hoc committee-at-arms". We are reminded by
Michael New’s symbolic refusal to wear the United
Nations' blue beret that, especially in the United
States, our troops end up in peacekeeping operations
when they are "drafted" into them by means of their
units' assignment to interventions -- after our soldiers
voluntarily and trustingly signed up to serve in our
military. Where does the obligation to one's country
end and fall under the shadow of something else?
(Certainly the morality of the presidential motion to
subject US troops to UN c ommand and the therefromresulting betrayal of the soldiers by their own country
must be seriously called into question) In this spirit,
any international laws specifically designed to
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address multinational peacekeeping operations must
never undermine the sovereignty of the nations whose
soldiers serve as peacekeepers, accommodate the fact
that the intervening nations are not themselves at
war, and allow for sufficient authority to ensure the
peacekeepers' safety.
3. Ensuring a universal standard of conduct; among the
contingents themselves, toward wounded from the
region to which the peacekeepers were deployed,
toward prisoners from either side of the conflict,
violators of the peacekeeper-established neutral zones
from either side, toward spies who would thwart the
peacekeeping efforts.
4. Strict neutrality: Although this is generally
understood as an underlying unspoken premise:
peacekeepers absolutely must never take sides in the
conflict. The peacekeepers’ neutrality must be
enforced, if necessary. Taking up sympathy with
either side of the conflict would: skew the “natural
balance of power” within the conflict itself by thereby
artificially adding more troops and materiel to either
side of the conflict, internally divide the peacekeepers
and destroy the impact of their team effort, give
international license to the conflict’s escalation
beyond its established boundaries (which is a most
dangerous proposition, as it could breed the seeds of a
world war).
5. Issue:
Peacekeepers' conduct and "diplomatic
immunity" as neutral entities. Peacekeepers are
deployed as neutral to the conflict. Thus they enjoy
the rights and privileges of neutrality: protection
from attack by either side of the conflict and the right
to self-defense against attack from either side. They
are also held to the duties of neutrality: Refraining
from involvement with either side, impartiality in
involvement with all sides of the conflict. The
standards of behavior as set forth in the laws of war
must also have jurisdiction over the peacekeepers.
As they are likely to be called into at least some
measure of military engagement, it must be clear that
peacekeepers are also not allowed to commit crimes
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7.

8.

9.
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against peace, against humanity, the civilityprescribing rules of warfare.
Peacekeepers’ right to self-defense: Peacekeepers
must be allowed to defend themselves from attacks
from either side of the conflict to which they were sent
as mediators-at-arms.
Conflicted region’s right to self-defense: There must
be universal legislation to address the matter of the
conflict-ridden area’s right to obtain weapons and
supplies from outside sources who are its normal
allies. This aspect must carefully weigh the conflict
suffering region’s right to self-defense and selfpreservation against the regional and international
needs of conflict containment.
Conscientious objection: There must be a clause
allowing for conscientious objection for those whose
deployment to a given conflict-ridden region would
compromise their national loyalties.
The question of signatories: Should peacekeepers be
chosen only from countries that are actually signatory
to the Conventions and/or Protocols that a given
peacekeeping mission is meant to uphold? Or should
the peacekeeping contingents be chosen based upon
military competence and the home countries’ moral
values? If the conflict-ridden region is not signatory
to the Conventions and/or Protocols, can they be held
to them? The line between international obligation
to a universal code of humanitarian morality and
outright “one-world police” is very thin indeed.

Operations: Peacekeeping legislation should define peacekeeping
missions and provide safeguards against the indefinite prolonging of a
peacekeeping group’s involvement in a given conflict beyond reason.
•
•
•
•
•

Assessment of the conflict (regional or internal)
Its moral implications
Its likelihood to be resolved without intervention
Its impact on greater/ surrounding region and its
security
Its impact on global security and international
balance of power
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•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Define the need:
What are the needs of the region?
Economic
stability? Internal stability?
An internal agreement? Ethnic mediation? A
regional agreement?
Define a checklist of criteria/ points on which to
decide whether or not to intervene.
Borrow from business practices and treat
administration of peacekeeping in the manner of a
businesslike strategic plan with thereto-attached
action plan and timeline.
⇒ this requires anticipation of “things going
wrong”.
⇒ this requires command-level flexibility in
planning and operations to respond
appropriately to the realities encountered in
the course of the peacekeeping mission.
⇒ this also requires some measure of autonomy
at the local level to allow the peacekeepers
sufficient “on-site” procedural flexibility to
allow the multinational participants to respond
to unanticipated command situations and as
necessitated by the course of events.
Define the method.
Define the objective.
What should the peacekeeping contingent accomplish
to meet identified needs?
Honestly assess whether the objective is feasible?
What are the criteria for determining feasibility of a
potential objective?
What are the maximum limits of conflict-resulting
danger and escalation to which troops should be
exposed before an intervention is declared futile?
(Otherwise, neutrality, immunity, credibility, and
effectiveness would break down.
Define systematically measurable success criteria.
As an umbrella goal to all of these above-mentioned
points: Define the parameters of the United Nations,
as it is the legal enforcer of international law
Carefully thought-out precautions must be taken to
define the relationship between autonomous and
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sovereign nations and the supranational body – after
all the UN is at once legislative (Conventions),
executive (peacekeepers), and judicial (World Court).
Nevertheless it is not a mega-nation with the right to
overstep the national command structures of any
multinational intervention forces under its umbrella.

Conclusion
What is needed is nothing short of Vienna Congress of sorts:
We need to delineate the role of the UN and similar regional
supranational leagues, define the peacekeepers’ rights and duties,
identify the legal as well as operational distinctions between war and
peacekeeping, compile a systematic checklist of typical scenarios and
special issues likely to confront the peacekeepers, draw up international
agreements forcing participants to define their peacekeeping missions’
objectives and limitations beforehand, and facilitate appropriate
measures for the international community to take in the event of a
failed peacekeeping endeavor. Only then can an international
consensus on morality be consistently enforced, the peacekeepers’ lives
protected, and sovereignty of nations preserved.
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